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We sought to determine whether Working Memory Capacity (WMC) predicts 
when an individual will exert or withhold cognitive control when faced with a control 
dilemma. We employed a high-congruency variation on the Stroop task to maximize 
conflict between automatic and controlled processing, and manipulated task instructions 
between participants to emphasize the importance of exerting cognitive control or convey 
typical speed/accuracy instructions. A 2 (trial type) x 2 (instructions) x 4 (WMC 
[quartiles]) analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed an interaction, in which instruction 
manipulations failed to affect the proportion of errors made by low- or mid-span 
individuals. High spans, however, made a lower proportion of errors when warned of task 
pitfalls than when not. Regression analyses suggested that, when warned of the pitfalls of 
relying on automatic processing, WMC and proportion of Stroop errors exhibit a 
negative, linear relationship. However, when the nature of the need to exert control was 
not explicit, a curvilinear pattern was observed. Those with high WMC appeared to 
strategically withhold control, relying instead on automatic processing. This led them to 
make a higher proportion of Stroop errors. Response latency data suggested that lower-
mid-spans were most rigid in their exertion of control, while high spans were especially 
flexible across instruction conditions. These data suggest a higher WMC allows for 
increased cognitive efficiency of cognitive control exertion across varied contexts. These 
 
 
results could be the product of an increase in cognitive resources allowing for better 
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Cognitive control is defined as the regulation of cognitive processes, such as 
reason and task-flexibility. It is influenced by many factors, both personal and 
environmental (McVay & Kane, 2009; Prakash, Hussain, & Schirda, 2015; van 
Steenbergen, 2015), but working memory capacity (WMC), in particular, has emerged as 
a strong predictor of one’s ability to exert cognitive control. Furthermore, research 
suggests that individuals with high WMC (high spans) are better able to exert cognitive 
control than those with low WMC (low spans; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; 
McVey & Kane, 2009).  
Interestingly, prior studies have also shown that situations exist in which high 
spans perform similarly to low spans (Miller, Watson, & Strayer, 2012; Watson, Miller, 
Lambert, & Strayer, 2008). This pattern seems to occur most noticeably during control 
dilemma tasks, which pit automatic and controlled processing against one another. Such 
tasks allow individuals to choose whether they exert control — and thus achieve better 
task performance — or strategically withhold it, thereby conserving cognitive resources 
for later use (Kahneman, 2011). Specifically, high spans fail to differ from low spans 
during high-conflict control dilemma tasks in which the importance of suppressing an 
automatic response during conflict is not made clear (Watson, Miller, Moffitt, Strayer, & 
Lambert, 2013). Still, psychologists have predominantly studied this phenomenon using 
motoric and sub-cortical automaticity, so high and low spans may only behave similarly
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during tasks that tap into highly potent automatic processes (e.g., antisaccade or Simon). 
Moreover, it remains unclear how those with intermediate WMC (mid-spans) behave in 
the face of a high-conflict control dilemma, and whether WMC is, indeed, the driving 
force behind the differences in control exertion observed at the extreme ends of the WMC 
spectrum. Thus, the present study sought to answer the following questions: 
1) Are previously observed control exertion patterns for differing WMCs (e.g., 
Watson et al., 2013) domain free? That is, can such patterns be found when the 
automatic responses in question are learned and therefore deal with higher order 
functions (e.g., word reading; Stroop), rather than when the automaticity is 
subcortical or motoric (e.g., button presses; Simon)? 
2) In addition to finding differences between the extreme ends of the WMC 
spectrum, as has been shown in previous studies (e.g., Hiebel & Zimmer, 2015; 
Storbeck, Davidson, Dahl, Blass, & Yung, 2015), will we find curvilinear (rather 
than linear and dichotomous) exertion patterns when accounting for the entire 
range of WMC levels? In other words, how can the behavior of the middle 50% of 
the WMC spectrum support or alter our theories as to the reason high spans 
sometimes differ  in behavior from low spans? 
Answering these questions will allow us to better understand how the availability 
of cognitive resources (as measured by WMC) interacts with context to affect an 
individual’s decision to exert or withhold control. This should allow us further theoretical 
insight into the relationship between WMC and controlled attention. 
Historically, working memory models involved a storage component, as well as a 
controlled processing component (see Miyaki & Shah, 1999, for review). In the last 
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decade, however, the field of cognitive neuroscience has widely begun to recognize that 
WMC can be reconceptualized as the ability to allocate resources to executive attention 
and control (Kane et al., 2007). In light of this theoretical shift, many recent theories of 
attention assert that high WMC is associated with increased capacity for exerting 
cognitive control when achieving a goal or manage sources of conflict or interference 
(Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall, & Engle, 2014). A good deal of work also suggests that 
WMC predicts performance in processes, such as stereotype regulation, action 
monitoring, multitasking, and inattentional blindness, (Lambert, Seegmiller, Stefanucci, 
& Watson, 2013; Miller et al., 2012; Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-Ward, & Watson, 
2013; Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer, 2011, respectively). Thus, it stands to reason that 
tasks which tap into higher level processes by pitting controlled and automatic processes 
against one another also give advantage to those with high WMC (Engle, Kane, & 
Tuholski, 1999). In fact, psychologists use many such control dilemma tasks when 
studying the exertion of control (e.g., Simon, Eriksen flanker, antisaccade, Stroop, and 
value-directed memory tasks). Observing how individuals with different WMCs respond 
to these tasks may help us to determine the mechanisms that allow for flexible transitions 
between automatic and controlled processing. 
However, control dilemma paradigms traditionally create situations in which the 
exertion of control leads to notably increased success, thereby placing an implicit 
premium on controlled processing. Relying only on controlled processing to accomplish 
one’s goals makes little sense when we consider that strategically withholding control in 
tasks of low importance allows us to conserve cognitive resources and benefit later on 
(Kennet & Wurm, 2014; Meiring, Subramoney, Thomas, Decety, & Fourie, 2014; Ward 
4 
 
& Mann, 2000). It is not necessarily obvious in day-to-day interactions who among us 
has a high or a low WMC. Therefore, modifying established paradigms to increase the 
likelihood of relying on automatic processing serves simultaneously to bring participants 
down from ceiling (Kane & Engle, 2003) and to create a more realistic scenario in which 
to investigate control exertion. Moreover, paradigms that are somewhat ambiguous in 
their required level of control exertion (i.e., high-conflict control dilemma tasks) may 
make it easier to manipulate whether an individual chooses to exert control.  
The possibility of manipulating exertion is supported by Goschke (2003), who 
asserted that controlled processing can be modulated by conscious intent, as well as 
activated automatically. Data from Stawarczyk, Majerus, Catale, and D’Argembeau, 
(2014) suggest that the exertion of cognitive control can be both facilitated and hindered 
by bottom-up, or stimulus-driven processes. These findings imply that explicit 
instructions aimed at altering the perceived importance of controlled processing might 
prompt participants to exert more control (see Watson et al., 2008), but the effects of 
instructional changes might differ for different WMCs. Conway and Engle (1994) 
theorized that differences in WMC actually reflect individuals’ varying abilities to inhibit 
irrelevant stimuli and attend to task-relevant information, rather than reflecting 
differences in their absolute capacity for holding information. Thus, it seems likely that 
differences in WMC – in addition to explaining differences in exertion ability – also 
change why and when individuals choose to exert control when presented with processing 
conflicts (Engle & Kane, 2004; Watson et al., 2013). 
While the current literature addresses some of the ways in which the exertion of 
cognitive control can be influenced, most studies of control exertion are designed using 
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paradigms that require reliance upon strongly automatic processes or strongly controlled 
attention to succeed. However, a growing number of theories surrounding cognitive 
control suggest that it is no longer advantageous to create a binary relationship between 
automatic and controlled processing. This is where control dilemma tasks, such as 
Stroop, become important.  
The Stroop task requires participants to suppress the automatic response of 
reading a color word (e.g., RED), and instead use controlled attention to verbalize the 
color in which the word is written (e.g., blue). In congruent trials, the color word and the 
font color are the same (e.g., RED), so relying on the automatic response of word reading 
does not decrease an individual’s level of performance. By contrast, incongruent trials 
contain stimuli written in a different color than the word itself (e.g., RED), so reliance on 
automaticity will result in error. We believe that further knowledge of cognitive control 
might be best acquired by using variations of Stroop that maximize conflict by containing 
a high ratio of congruent (automaticity-friendly) to incongruent (control-necessary) trials. 
This would increase conflict and task ambiguity, because when the already-easier option 
of falling back on automatic processing leads to a fairly acceptable success rate, the habit 
of relying on automaticity becomes more likely to occur. When the perceived benefit of 
using either automatic or controlled processing becomes virtually equivalent, 
participants’ reliance on context when deciding whether to exert or withhold control 
should increase. In the present study, examining differences in both WMC and context as 
they relate to control exertion should provide a better understanding of the relationship 
between WMC and cognitive control. 
Furthermore, in varying the prepotency of the task from subcortical activation 
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(such as that needed for anti-saccade), and even going so far as to remove the manual 
motoric aspects of the task (as needed for Simon), we can use the Stroop task to test the 
circumstantial limits of the control dilemma. That is, we can learn whether the relatively 
lower prepotency of word reading is still strong enough to cause those with available 
cognitive resources to rely on automaticity, or whether the cost of exertion is close 
enough to the cost of relying on automaticity that those with available cognitive resources 
continue to exert control in all contexts. Both the decreased prepotency of the task and 
the high ratio of congruent trials serve to limit the influence of task-inherent cues that 
might facilitate control exertion. This will allow us to more easily manipulate explicit 
contextual cues that encourage exertion — at least in those with cognitive resources to 
exert (i.e., high spans).  
To create explicit contextual changes and determine their influence on control 
exertion, we altered our task instructions to suggest either high or ambiguous importance 
of exerting control. Similar techniques were used by Watson et al. (2008, 2013) to elicit 
control exertion in the Simon and Saccade tasks. It may be that those with high WMC are 
willing to use their resources to overcome the automatic response of word reading when 
informed that high accuracy for incongruent (control-necessary) trials is the goal of the 
task. The question then becomes whether the abundance of resources in high WMC 
individuals would be worth spending on suppressing the automatic word reading 
response, especially in a high congruency situation.  
If high spans exert control when warned of the importance of incongruent trials, 
but rely on automaticity when unaware, we will see results similar to what prior studies 
(Watson et al., 2013; Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005) have found. If, however, 
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contextual changes have no effect, we may see high spans exert control regardless of 
context and suppress the automatic response. This might occur because they have 
resources to spare, or because word reading is not a potent enough automatic response. 
However, Watson et al. (2005) asked participants to complete a Deese-Roediger-
Mcdermott (DRM) paradigm, which like Stroop contains verbal stimuli. For this study, 
the authors also manipulated instructional warnings — in this case to explain (or not) the 
risk of false memories — and used participants’ WMC as a predictor. They found that 
instances of false memory were reduced only for high spans in the warning condition, but 
that no differences presented between high and low spans in the no-warning condition. 
Although automatic spreading activation in the DRM and the automatic response of word 
reading in Stroop differ in prepotency, both involve verbal stimuli. Based on results from 
the Watson et al. study, we predict that high spans will show greater advantage as a result 
of explicit warnings, compared to low spans. Conversely, we predict that the no-warning 
condition will indicate no significant differences between the upper and lower extremes 
of the WMC spectrum. However, even if the pattern of high span exertion remains 
similar to what has been observed, it is still unclear how those with intermediate WMC 
might respond to varying contexts.  
Oddly, few control exertion studies, if any, examine working memory on a 
continuous scale, choosing instead to focus on the extreme ends of the WMC spectrum. 
This methodological choice does not account for a large portion of the population, and 
could mask important information, which would further our understanding of how 
individual differences in WMC affect cognitive control. If, for instance, there is a linear 
relationship between WMC and Stroop performance, we should find that mid-spans 
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perform better relative to low spans, and worse relative to high spans. On the other hand, 
high spans may choose not to exert control unless warned, because their ample cognitive 
resources are not fully drained by the task, and they therefore have resources left over, 
which enables them to learn — fairly early on — that the congruency ratio allows them to 
rely on word reading and still succeed. Simply put, high spans might just be better than 
others at maximizing cognitive efficiency. Should this be the case, the mid-spans would 
theoretically exert control in both contexts, yielding a curvilinear pattern in Stroop error 
rate. This is because although in relation to low spans, mid-spans have ample control to 
exert, they may not have enough resources to successfully complete a task while 
simultaneously capitalizing on their metacognitive abilities. Without access to sufficient 
metacognition, they could perform well, but would do so at the cost of efficiency. Thus, 
with mid-span response patterns adding potential nuance to the data, we can better infer 
reasons as to the exertion (or lack thereof) on the part of high WMC individuals, based on 





 Participants consisted of male and female undergraduate students (N = 180, ages 
18-40) recruited from a mountain west university. Each student received course credit for 
their participation. All possessed normal or corrected-to-normal vision, as well as normal 
color vision. Participants were tested in individual rooms for a single session, which 
lasted no more than an hour. We recruited the first 14 participants based on their working 
memory capacity (WMC), as determined by operation span task scores from a separate 
experiment. These participants were chosen, because they had scored in either the lower 
or upper quartile, according to thresholds determined by Unsworth et al. (2005). The 
remaining 166 participants were recruited from the psychology department participant 
pool. Of these, 4 participants were excluded from analyses due to computer errors, 4 due 
to failure to maintain accuracy for reading span sentence verification, and 3 due to 
average response latencies greater than 1250 ms in Stroop. Thus, we analyzed data from a 




E-Prime. To present both the reading span and the Stroop task, we used the 2003 
version of E-prime software (PST, Inc.). 
Reading span. We asked participants to complete an automated reading span task 
(as described in Unsworth et al., 2005). The program displayed all stimuli in black,
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Times New Roman, 24pt font on a white background. The testing portion consisted of a 
maximum 15 trials (three of each set size), with set sizes ranging from 3 to 7 letters. A 
sentence verification (length of 5-10 words) required participants to make sense/nonsense 
judgements between the appearances of each letter. 
Stroop. Our version of this task included only the color words RED, GREEN, and 
BLUE, with the same three corresponding font colors. The stimuli contained a proportion 
of 75% congruent trials (e.g., RED written in red font) and 25% incongruent trials (e.g., 
RED written in green font) with the intent of maximizing participants’ reliance on the 
automatic process of word reading (see Kane & Engle, 2003 for a review). Within the 
congruent trials, we used an equal number (25% each) of the words RED, BLUE and 
GREEN. Of the incongruent trials, we used an equal number of each possible variation 
(RED, RED, GREEN, GREEN, BLUE and BLUE). All trials were presented in Times 
New Roman 24pt font in one of the three font colors and always on a black background. 





 After obtaining informed consent, we began the experiment, which was separated 
into two tasks: the automated reading span and the Stroop.  
Reading span. Participants completed a computerized reading span task as a 
measure of WMC. The task asked participants to simultaneously memorize a series of 
letters, which appeared on the screen in between sentences. Participants determined 
whether each sentence was either sensical (e.g., The dog likes to go for walks with his 
owner.) or nonsensical (e.g., The colander likes to go for walks with his owner.), and 
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responded with “True” or “False,” respectively. We gave participants written instructions 
within the E-prime platform, as well as a verbal reminder to read the instructions 
carefully before starting. We then left participants alone in the testing room as they 
complete the reading span, which consisted of practice for letter recall, practice for 
sentence verification, and practice performing both together before the experimental trials 
began. Upon completion of the testing portion, participants notified the researcher, who 
recorded the five reading span output scores and set up the Stroop task, while the 
participant rested (approximately 2-5 min). 
Stroop. Participants sat directly in front of the monitor and close to the tabletop 
microphone, which recorded vocal response latencies (RTs) using an SR box. The 
researcher sat beside the participant and used the keyboard to code participant response 
accuracies and SR box errors. The possible codes were as follows: c- correct, clean RT; i 
– incorrect, clean RT; s – correct, SR box error; o – incorrect, SR box error; u – 
unknown/no response due to SR box error. The researcher also read aloud all instructions 
that appeared on the screen. Before beginning each of the testing blocks, participants 
completed a set of 12 practice trials. 
In the “warning” condition, we gave participants instructions that warned of the 
high congruency proportion, and explained that reliance on reading the color word during 
congruent trials will lead to poor performance when confronted with incongruent trials. 
Instructions read: 
In the following trials, you will be shown color words (e.g., BLUE) written 
in various font colors (e.g., red). Please say aloud the color in which the 
word is written, rather than the word itself. Remember to be as fast and as 
accurate as possible. You may find in many trials, the color word (e.g., 
RED) will match the font color (e.g., red), making it easy to respond with 
the correct font color. Remember, these are filler trials meant to distract you 
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from the given task of font color naming, and they allow you to rely on word 
reading to give the correct answer. This may cause you to perform poorly 
when the color word and font color don't match (i.e., BLUE is written in red 
or green font), even though these nonmatching trials are the critical trials in 
which we are interested. 
 
In the “no-warning” condition, we gave only the speed/accuracy instructions, 
which consist of the first three sentences of the warning condition text. The program 
reiterated instructions at the start of each of the three blocks. Upon completion of the 





 We excluded all trials with a length greater than 1250 ms or less than 250 ms 
from analyses. This removed fewer than 2% of trials from subsequent analyses, and did 
not include trials in which the SR box was coded to have erred. We excluded trials 
containing SR box errors from response latency analyses, but not from error analyses. 
 
Stroop Error Rate 
 
ANOVA. We first examined only the upper and lower quartiles of WMC in a 2 
(warning condition) x 2 (trial type) x 2 (WMC span) mixed model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to determine whether the error proportions observed in high and low spans in 
the present study resemble those found in previous work (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003). 
Analyses revealed a three-way interaction, F(1, 81) = 6.60, p = .012, 
2
p  = .075. 
Additional analyses indicated no significant differences between high and low spans for 
incongruent trials in either warning group, ps ≥ .21. In contrast, within incongruent trials, 
high and low spans differed significantly in the warning condition p > .001, but failed to 
differ in error rate when no warning was given, p = .24. 
To next determine whether all four WMC quartiles differed from one another 
across various groups, we submitted the data to a 2 (warning condition) x 2 (trial type) x 
4 (WMC span) mixed model ANOVA. See Table 1 for means. The data revealed a 
significant three-way interaction, F(3, 161) = 5.68, p = .001, 
2
p  = .096. First, within 
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congruent trials, we found no differences in Stroop error rate across either WMC span or 
warning condition, Fs ≤ 1.12, ps ≥.40. In contrast, significant differences for incongruent 
trials for both WMC and warning condition were apparent, F(3, 165) = 19.73, p < .001, 
F(1, 165) = 4.84, p = .029, respectively.  
Within incongruent trials in the warning condition, only high spans and upper-
mid-spans failed to differ significantly from one another in proportion of Stroop errors 
made, p = .63, all other ps ≤ .001. Low spans made the highest number of errors, 
followed by lower-mid-spans, then upper-mid-spans and high spans (Figure 1). See Table 
1 for means. 
For incongruent trials in the no-warning condition, a different pattern emerged. 
Low spans made significantly more errors than lower- and upper-mid-spans (p = .007, p 
= .001, respectively), but failed to differ in any meaningful way from high spans (p = 
.24). Upper and lower-mid-span error rates were not significantly different from one 
another (p >.99), and high spans did not differ significantly from any of the other groups, 
all ps ≥ .24 (Figure 1). We think it important to note that only high spans’ error rates were 
significantly affected by warning condition, p = .001, all other ps ≥ .34. 
Generally, we believe these accuracy data indicate an increased flexibility in high 
spans’ control exertion, compared to those with low or intermediate WMC. To further 
investigate the differing patterns of error rate across the full WMC spectrum, rather than 
arbitrary bins, we turn to regression analyses. 
Regression. For the warning condition, we used a linear regression to determine 
whether working memory capacity (WMC) predicted Stroop performance when 
instructions explained the importance of incongruent trials to participants. We found a 
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significant, negative relationship between WMC and proportion of errors made, ß = -.77, 
t(84) = 21.46, p < .001, with an increase in WMC predicting a decreased proportion of 
Stroop errors (Figure 2). WMC also explained a significant proportion of variance within 
Stroop error rate, R2 = .59, F(1, 84) = 123.07, p < .001. This suggests that, when told 
control exertion is necessary for success, those with higher WMC were both willing and 
able to allocate cognitive resources to the task. Those with lower WMC, on the other 
hand, seemed less able to exert cognitive control.  
For the no-warning condition, a linear regression tested whether the pattern 
observed above could be seen in the absence of task-related information aside from 
typical Stroop instructions. The model fit was marginally significant, ß = -.21, t(83) = 
3.9, p = .052, suggesting a somewhat negative relationship between WMC and proportion 
of Stroop errors made. We then applied a quadratic curve estimate to the data, and found 
that the quadratic model accounted for a significant proportion of variance within Stroop 
errors, R2 = .12, F(2, 82) = 5.20, p = .008  (Figure 3). This model predicted that those 
with intermediate levels of WMC made fewer errors than individuals on either end of the 
WMC spectrum. The relatively larger number of errors made by higher spans suggests 
that, when not warned, those with high WMC strategically withheld control, leading them 




 We excluded all incorrect trials (approximately 8.6%) from response time (RT) 
analyses. Again, we began with a 2 (warning condition) x 2 (trial type) x 2 (WMC span) 
mixed model ANOVA, with trial type as a repeated measure, to examine differences 
between high and low spans in response latency. The analysis yielded an interaction 
16 
 
between trial type and WMC span, F(1, 81) = 18.73, p < .001, 2p = .19, wherein no 
differences were observed between high and low spans for congruent trials, p = .54, but 
high spans had a significantly faster naming speed than low spans during incongruent 
trials, F(1, 84) = 7.12, p = .009. 
 ANOVA. In order address our research question of how results change when we 
include the middle 50% of the WMC spectrum, we next submitted the data to a 2 
(warning) x 2 (trial type) x 4 (WMC Span) ANOVA. Means for all conditions and sub 
groups are represented in Table 1. 
We found a main effect of warning condition on average response latency, F(1, 
161) = 4.3, p = .040, 2p = .026, wherein participants who were warned responded slower 
than those who were not, suggesting, generally, that the warning condition encouraged 
the exertion of control.  
Though no main effect of WMC was present, p = .13, we found a significant 
interaction between WMC and trial type, F(3, 161) = 7.65, p < .001, 2p = .13. This was 
due to congruent trials showing no differences between spans, F(3, 165) = .91, p = .44,  
whereas RTs during incongruent trials changed significantly across spans, F(3, 165) = 
3.26, p = .023, 2p = .056. Within incongruent trials, pairwise comparisons revealed that 
high spans were faster to respond than lower-mid-spans, p = .020 (Figure 4). 
No further significant results were observed, Fs ≤ 1.88, p ≥ .13. And the absence of a 
three-way interaction for participants’ average RT stands in contrast with the error rate 
data, for which both the traditional (2x2x2) and the full quartile (2x2x4) ANOVAs 




Figure 1. Average Stroop error rate for incongruent trials by WMC quartiles in the 





































































































Figure 4. Average response latency within incongruent trials by WMC and warning 


































Average Proportion of Stroop Errors and Average Response Latencies (ms) for Different 
WMC Spans across Warning Condition and Trial Type 
 Trial type 
 Congruent Incongruent 
 Latency Error rate Latency Error rate 
Group M SD M SD M SD M SD 
No warning         
Low 596.69 68.21 .005 .0083 767.89 75.83 .12 .052 
Lower-mid 619.93 67.40 .006 .012 772.13 72.46 .072 .037 
Upper-mid 598.12 85.97 .0048 .0061 725.30 102.13 
. 
.061 .038 
High 577.43 65.14 .0031 .0041 705.24 89.03 .09 .051 
Warning         
Low 608.69 64.51 .0017 .0028 769.62 78.88 .11 .022 
Lower-mid 617.20 105.86 .0027 .0036 793.45 126.16 .085 .027 
Upper-mid 630.43 84.39 .0021 .0038 779.76 114.04 .054 .024 






We measured WMC using an automated reading span task and asked participants 
to complete three blocks of a high-congruency variation of the Stroop Task. Half of the 
participants were given established speed/accuracy instructions for the Stroop, while the 
other half were told that incongruent trials were the focus of our study, and that relying 
on the automatic response of reading could be detrimental to their performance. The 
following discussion will address whether our data provided evidence for a domain-free 
control dilemma, what the response patterns from individuals with intermediate WMC 
add to theory, and what the underlying mechanisms of our results might be.  
In the warning condition, the present study replicated previous work, in which 
high and low WMC inversely predicted Stroop performance in high-congruency task 
variants (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003). Kane and Engle’s study also used a 75% congruency 
version of Stroop and they discovered that WMC and Stroop error rate were negatively 
correlated, but their instructions were quite similar to those used in our warning 
condition. Thus, while they were very much correct in their assertion that WMC and 
Stroop performance were linearly related, it seems their results were most likely due to 
the warning embedded in the instructions they used prior to having participants begin the 
task.  
We, too, established a clearly linear relationship between WMC and proportion of 
errors made on incongruent trials, and found that WMC related inversely to Stroop error
23 
 
 rate when the context reinforced the task goal (i.e., when participants were warned). The 
addition of mid-spans to the analyses further supported this relationship, in that those 
with roughly average WMC fit soundly within the expectations of previous work, making 
a lower proportion of errors compared to low spans, but a greater number compared to 
high spans. Thus, the presence of an explicit instruction for the need to exert control 
makes it such that no strategic conservation of cognitive resources occurs anywhere on 
the WMC spectrum. Otherwise said, individuals in the warning condition performed to 
what was roughly the best of their ability. In the absence of a warning, however, a 
curvilinear pattern emerged, wherein higher spans began to make more errors than had 
been observed in the warning condition, and began to behave more like low spans, likely 
due to increased reliance on automaticity. This is where the present study deviated from 
previous works, and these no-warning data provide crucial insight into the relationship 
between WMC and control exertion flexibility.  
One such insight relates to our question of whether or not the habit of word 
reading is practiced enough to produce a control dilemma. Furthermore, it appears that 
the automaticity associated with reading was, in fact, strong enough to cause sufficient 
conflict and prompt high spans in the no-warning condition to rely on automaticity. The 
differential response patterns of behavior observed across conditions in high WMC 
participants would suggest that the task did, in fact elicit a control dilemma. Thus, we 
conclude from the data that a learned automatic response, such as reading, which is 
consistently practiced, becomes habit enough to cause cognitive processing conflicts. 
This is at least true for high-congruency variations of the task.  
In addition to demonstrating a control dilemma in Stroop, the curvilinear pattern 
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of error rates during incongruent trials in the no-warning condition allows us to answer 
our second question: how including mid-spans in analyses advances our understanding of 
WMC and its relationship to control exertion. We believe our data provide considerable 
evidence for individual’s cognitive resource availability dictating not only how well, but 
also when that individuals can/will exert control. In particular, the data allow us to focus 
our theories on high span behavior as anomalous. Without demonstrating that mid-spans 
continue to exert control, regardless of context, it would be difficult to argue that changes 
in high span performance are the exception. That is, prior to including intermediate 
WMC, one could have asserted that high spans’ ample resources made them especially 
flexible compared to other WMCs just as easily as they might have argued that low 
spans’ lack of resources made them especially rigid. The fact that only high spans altered 
their behavior when not warned to strategically withhold cognitive control suggests that 
cognitive efficiency is not the norm. Furthermore, only at a certain level of executive 
functioning can an individual allocate their resources in such a way that they can 
complete the task while simultaneously keeping in mind a bigger-picture perspective of 
their goal. Therefore, we interpret our curvilinear error data as indicating better 
metacognitive abilities within high spans. Generally speaking, it seems that the addition 
of mid-spans has allowed us to narrow down potential underlying mechanisms for 
behavioral patterns. 
 The response latency data build nicely upon the evidence provided by our error 
data, and ultimately indicate that high spans could possess exceptional cognitive control 
exertion flexibility. Longer RTs for incongruent trials compared with congruent trials 
serve as a reassurance that Stroop interference occurred, and that interference required 
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increased cognitive control. Longer response latencies in the warning condition compared 
to the no-warning — specifically for incongruent trials — suggest that the warning did, in 
fact, encourage participants to exert control. 
 Because it collapses across warning conditions, the interaction between trial type 
and WMC within the full quartile (2x2x4) ANOVA, wherein high spans in incongruent 
trials were significantly faster than lower-mid-spans, indicates that lower-mid-spans were 
the most rigid in their exertion of control. The similarity of high span RTs and low span 
RTs is most likely due to high spans’ reliance on automaticity in the no-warning 
condition (as demonstrated by the error data) decreasing their average response latency. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the likeness of high span and upper-mid-span RTs may 
have resulted from the high end of the upper-mid-spans being somewhat flexible — or at 
least less rigid than true mid-spans — across warning conditions, decreasing the average 
RT of the quartile enough to attenuate previously-existing differences. Again, these data 
point to an increased ability of those with higher WMC to implement strategies for 
cognitive efficiency.  
When comparing our response latency analyses of only the extreme upper and 
lower quartiles (2x2x2 ANOVA) to those from Kane and Engle (2003; mentioned 
above), it is important to note that their study included neutral trials (e.g., TRUCK), as 
well as differing congruency ratios within participants (0% congruent vs. 75% 
congruent). For the present purpose, we focus our discussion of their paper on the 75% 
congruent variation only. Kane and Engle’s RT analyses investigated facilitation and 
inhibition, and their data yielded no difference across WMC for interference effects — 
that is, high and low spans produced similar response times during incongruent trials. In 
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contrast, it appeared that facilitation effects (the latency difference between neutral and 
congruent trials) were greater for low spans, suggesting that low spans were more likely 
than high spans to use the information provided by the color words in congruent trials.  
Although the present study did not include neutral trials, and so cannot speak to 
facilitation effects, we found that interference effects differed between low and high 
spans in our more established analyses (2x2x2), and differed between high spans and 
lower-mid-spans in the full quartile ANOVA. The likely reason for finding no difference 
after adding intermediate spans was an increase in standard error (see Figure 4). Still, the 
differences observed between high and the two lower quartiles spans make for 
compelling evidence that lower WMC leads to increased rigidity of control exertion. And 
these data are especially persuasive when evaluated alongside patterns shown by the 
Stroop error data. 
 As a whole, the change in error rate patterns across warning conditions implies 
that those with high WMC possess a unique ability to factor contextual cues into strategic 
conservation of cognitive resources. This increase is cognitive efficiency seems to be due 
to the amount of cognitive resources available to high spans (or high spans’ ability to 
appropriately allocate resources) and sets them apart from the rest of the WMC spectrum. 
The dissimilarities in response latency analyses were most apparent between high spans 
and lower-mid-spans. These results add greatly to our understanding of the relationship 
between WMC and control exertion, because it displays a contrast between WMC levels 
within the range of individuals able to successfully exert control, compared to low spans. 
This allows for a more nuanced understanding of where and why changes in WMC 
produce varied response patterns in high-conflict paradigms. 
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 Though the data are encouraging, we still have much to learn about the 
relationship between executive functioning and cognitive control. We acknowledge that 
the Stroop is anomalous in many ways. Important for us to keep in mind is that word 
reading — though still a learned task — is so well-practiced that we cannot consider it 
representative of learned automatic processes, as a whole. It might be worthwhile in 
future experiments to train participants on a novel task to the point of automaticity and 
then present task, which places a premium on a conflicting response. Given the that 
Stroop effects are best observed in paradigms employing a high-congruency ratio, 
determining whether differing levels of automaticity (e.g., automatic motoric, highly 
practiced learned automatic, and recently-learned automatic) alter control exertion across 
differing congruency ratios might allow for more comprehensive theories to be 
established. 
Still, we believe our data create a strong case for understanding the control 
dilemma as a domain-free phenomenon. What’s more, the data offer good indication that 
the inclusion of intermediate WMC individuals in analyses affords us greater theoretical 
leverage. In summary, we can confidently say that the error and response time data 
provide converging evidence, which suggests that in control dilemma scenarios, high 
spans are capable of maximizing cognitive efficiency. This efficiency manifests itself as 
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